Mixed oligopoly with consumer-friendly public firms by Roy Chowdhury, Prabal
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Mixed oligopoly with consumer-friendly
public firms
Prabal Roy Chowdhury
Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi Center
July 2007
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4255/
MPRA Paper No. 4255, posted 26. July 2007
Mixed Oligopoly with Consumer-friendly Public
Firms
Prabal Roy Chowdhury
Indian Statistical Institute - Delhi Centre
July 26, 2007
Abstract
We consider a mixed oligopoly with a public firm that maximizes
the sum of its own profits and consumers’ surplus. We characterize
the unique pure strategy equilibrium and show that as long as the cost
function is not “too concave”, privatization reduces welfare. We find
that while the first best cannot be implemented using a tax/subsidy
policy that is the same for all firms, a budget-balancing policy that
involves a tax on the public firm, coupled with subsidies to the private
firms, can do so. Further, the optimal tax/subsidy policy is critically
dependent on whether there is privatization or not.
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1 Introduction
One of the major debates in the transitional economies, e.g. India, con-
cerns the privatization of public firms. Clearly, any informed debate needs
a framework that incorporates some of the ground realities in transitional
economies. In this paper we make a beginning in developing such a frame-
work. As our analysis shows, many of the results in the literature are sen-
sitive to whether these realities are modeled or not.
While there is a growing and large literature on mixed oligopoly that ex-
amines the interaction between private and public firms, this literature gen-
erally assumes that the public firms maximize social welfare. In transitional
economies it may, however, be more reasonable to assume that the public
firms are consumer-friendly, i.e. they maximize the sum of their own prof-
its and consumers’ surplus. Given that many such transitional economies
have a long history of public firms being guided by socialist ideals, and the
suspicion with which the private sector is viewed under socialism, it seems
reasonable to assume that public firms in such economies put very little
weight on private sector profits. Even though some of these economies are
moving away from their socialist past, the suspicion of the private sector
remains.1
Further, we allow for the fact that public firms in transitional economies
often have soft budget constraints. Thus loss-making public firms are often
bailed out with cheap credit, or even direct subsidy. In the Indian context,
for example, many public firms are loss-making, sometimes chronically so.2
This is formalized by assuming that the public firm does not have to meet
1In India, for example, privatization of public sector units is facing rough weather.
The main argument being that, apart from their own profits, public firms also care for
the consumers.
2In the Indian context, Fertiliser Corporation was the largest loss-making CPSU (cen-
tral public sector unit) with a loss of Rs. 1210 crore in 2004-05. The top ten loss-making
CPSUs had an aggregate loss of Rs. 6060 crore (Public Enterprises Survey, 2004-2005).
In fact, of the 292 CPSUs, about 92 are chronically loss-making.
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any budget constraint.
We consider a mixed oligopoly with one consumer-friendly public firm
and n private firms. We demonstrate that there is a unique pure strategy
equilibrium. Further, as long as the cost function is not ‘too concave’ (to
be precise, marginal cost is convex, or linear), privatization reduces welfare,
i.e. the welfare level under mixed oligopoly is higher compared to that
under privatization (i.e. Cournot competition). In particular, this is true
for quadratic cost functions. This is interesting since, in a framework with
welfare maximizing public firms and quadratic costs, De Fraja and Delbono
(1989) find that the mixed oligopoly welfare level may be lower compared
to Cournot competition.
Given that the public firms are consumer-friendly, we than turn to an-
alyzing the consumers’ surplus. We find that it is higher compared to that
under Cournot competition. Further, the consumers’ surplus under mixed
oligopoly is greater (respectively less) than the first best level, if the marginal
cost function is concave (respectively convex).
The existing mixed oligopoly literature with welfare maximizing public
firms finds that a non-discriminating subsidy (which is same across all firms)
implements the first best irrespective of whether there is privatization or not.
Further, the level of subsidy is the same in both cases. Contributions in this
field include, among others, White (1996), Poyago-Theotoky (2001), Myles
(2002), Fjell and Heywood (2004) and Kato and Tomaru (2007). This set of
results is sometimes referred to as the irrelevance principle, since it suggests
that privatization of public firms is irrelevant if there is a welfare maximizing
tax/subsidy policy in place.
We re-examine the irrelevance principle in a framework with consumer-
friendly public firms. To this end we examine if the first best outcome can
be implemented through an appropriate tax/subsidy policy. In case the pol-
icy is non-discriminating, we find that the first best cannot be implemented.
Interestingly, however, the first best can be implemented by levying an ap-
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propriate per unit tax on the public firm, and providing a per unit subsidy to
the private firms. These results are in contrast to those under privatization
(i.e. Cournot competition) where it is well known that a non-discriminating
subsidy can implement the first best.3 Thus our results suggest that in the
presence of consumer-friendly public firms the optimal tax/subsidy policy
is critically dependent on whether there is privatization or not, i.e. the
irrelevance principle does not hold.
In the next section we set up the model and solve for the unique equi-
librium. We then compare the welfare level with that under Cournot com-
petition. In section 3, we examine the optimal tax/subsidy policy. Section
4 concludes.
2 The Model
There are n private firms and one consumer-friendly public firm all produc-
ing a homogeneous good. The private firms are profit maximizers, whereas
the public firm maximizes the sum of its own profits and consumers’ surplus.4
We examine a mixed oligopoly, i.e. a simultaneous move quantity-setting
game where every firm maximizes its own objective.
The output of the i-th private firm is denoted qi and that of the public
firm is q0, so that Q = q0 +
∑n
1 qi. The inverse demand function is f(Q).
Firms are symmetric with the cost function of all firms, including the public
firm, being c(q).
Assumption 1. (i) The inverse demand f : (0,∞) → [0,∞) and
∃Qˆ, 0 < Qˆ < ∞, such that f(Q) > 0 if 0 ≤ Q < Qˆ, and f(Q) = 0
if Q ≥ Qˆ. Further, f(Q) is twice differentiable, decreasing and (weakly)
concave, i.e. f ′(Q) < 0 and f ′′(Q) ≤ 0, for all Q such that Qˆ > Q > 0.
3See, e.g. the mixed oligopoly literature with welfare maximizing public firms.
4Matsumura (1998) examines a mixed duopoly where the public firm maximizes a
weighted sum of its own profits and social welfare. In such a scenario he examines the
issue of partial privatization.
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(ii) The cost function c : [0,∞)→ [0,∞) is twice differentiable, increas-
ing and convex, i.e. c′(qi) > 0 and c′′(qi) > 0, ∀qi ≥ 0. Also, c(0) = c′(0) = 0.
The assumption that f ′′(Q) ≤ 0 implies that the second order conditions
for the private firms are satisfied. Assumption 2 below ensures that the
corresponding condition holds for the public firm.
Assumption 2. f ′(Q)− (Q− q)f ′′(Q)− c′′(q) < 0, ∀Q ≥ q > 0.
One sufficient condition (given that f ′′(Q) ≤ 0), for A2 to hold is that
the marginal demand function, f ′(Q), is elastic, i.e. f
′(Q)/Q
f ′′(Q) ≥ 1. A2 also
holds if the demand function is linear.
The profit function of the i-th firm is given by
pii = qif(Q)− c(qi), i = 0, 1, · · · , n. (1)
The payoff of the public firm is the sum of its own profit and the consumers’
surplus. Thus its payoff
P = q0f(Q)− c(q0) +
∫ Q
0
f(z)dz − f(Q)Q. (2)
We then define the first best outcome, i.e. the output vector maximizing
social welfare. Clearly, it involves every firm producing q∗, where q∗ solves
f((n+ 1)q∗) = c′(q∗). (3)
At this output vector price equals marginal cost for every firm. Given A1,
q∗ is well defined. Let Q∗ = (n+ 1)q∗.
Before proceeding further let us solve for the benchmark case of Cournot
competition with private firms. This is of particular interest since Cournot
competition can be interpreted as arising out of privatizing the public firm.
Cournot competition: There are n + 1 profit-maximizing firms who
compete over quantity. Clearly, the first order conditions (FOCs) involve
f(Q) + qif ′(Q) = c′(qi). (4)
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It is standard to show that there is a unique Cournot equilibrium5 where
all firms produce an output level of qC (> 0) where qC is the unique solution
to f((n+1)q)+ qf ′((n+1)q) = c′(q). Let Qc = (n+1)qc. Clearly, Qc < Q∗.
Mixed oligopoly: Let the equilibrium output vector be denoted by
(q′0, q′1, · · · , q′n), with the aggregate output being denoted by Q′.
We first argue that in any equilibrium all private firms have the same
output. Suppose to the contrary, q′i > q
′
j ≥ 0 for some i 6= j. Since
q′i > 0, q
′
if
′(Q′) + f(Q′) − c′(q′i) = 0. Hence q′jf ′(Q′) + f(Q′) − c′(q′j) >
q′if
′(Q′)+ f(Q′)− c′(q′i) = 0, where the first inequality follows from the fact
that q′i > q
′
j , f
′(Q) < 0 and c′′(q) > 0. Thus the j-th firm has an incentive
to increase its output, contradiction. Hence q′i = q
′ for all i ≥ 1.
Further, in equilibrium q′ > 0. Suppose to the contrary q′ = 0, so that
Q′ = q′0. Then, from the public firm’s first order condition, the equilibrium
q′0 solves f(q′0) = c′(q′0) > 0. Since c′(0) = 0, for qi small, qif ′(q′0) + f(q′0)−
c′(qi) > 0, so that the i-th private firm has an incentive to increase its
output.
Consequently, the first order condition of the private firms is given by
f(q0 + nq) + qf ′(q0 + nq) = c′(q). (5)
Let q0 = g(q), where g(q) solves (5) when a solution exists,6 otherwise
let g(q) = 0. From A1, g(q) is clearly decreasing in q. Further, g(0) = Qˆ > 0
(since c′(0) = 0) and there exists q˜ such that g(q) = 0 ∀q ≥ q˜.7
Next consider the first order condition of the public firm:
f(Q) + q0f ′(Q)− c′(q0)−Qf ′(Q) = 0. (6)
Using the first order conditions of the private firms and the fact that the
5See, e.g. Kolstad and Mathiesen (1987).
6From A1, if equation (5) has a solution for q0, it is unique.
7Such a q˜ exists since, for q = Qˆ/n, the LHS of (5) is less than the RHS, ∀q0.
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output level of all firms are symmetric, the above can be re-written as:8
c′(q)− c′(q0)− (n+ 1)qf ′(Q) = 0. (7)
From (7) we can write q0 = h(q). From A1, h(q) is well defined and in-
creasing in q. Further, h(0) = 0 (since c′(0) = 0) and h(q) > 0 for all
q sufficiently large. Thus, g(q) and h(q) have a unique intersection (see
Figure 1). Further, from equation (7), q′0 > q′.
Summarizing the above discussion we have
Proposition 1 The mixed oligopoly game has a unique equilibrium where
all private firms produce the same output, say q′. Further, the output level
of the public firm exceeds that of the private firms, i.e. q′.
2.1 Welfare Analysis
To begin with note that while the first best outcome is symmetric, the mixed
oligopoly one is not. This immediately implies that the mixed oligopoly
outcome is sub-optimal.
We then examine the welfare effects of privatization, i.e. compare the
welfare under a mixed oligopoly with that under Cournot competition. We
start by comparing the consumers’ surplus (i.e. the aggregate output) un-
der the two regimes. Given that the public firms focus on consumers’ sur-
plus (apart from own profits of course), this is also of independent interest.
Clearly, the Cournot equilibrium is defined by the intersection of g(q) with
the 45 degree line (see figure 1). Next recall that the mixed oligopoly in-
volves q′0 > q′, so that it lies above the 45 degree line. Hence, from figure 1,
q′0 > qC > q′. Next, totally differentiating (5)
dQ
dq
=
dq0
dq
+ n =
c′′(q)− f ′(Q)
qf ′′(Q) + f ′(Q)
< 0. (8)
8Note that for q0 small, the LHS of equation (6) is strictly positive. Thus any equilib-
rium must involve a positive output for the public firm.
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Since q′ < qC , from (8) it follows that the aggregate output level is higher
under a mixed oligopoly. Given that the public firm’s objective function
includes consumers’ surplus, this is quite intuitive. This immediately im-
plies that the consumers’ surplus is higher compared to that under Cournot
competition.
Lemma 1 The aggregate output, and consequently consumers’ surplus, un-
der mixed oligopoly exceed that under Cournot competition.
As an intermediate step to comparing the welfare levels under mixed
oligopoly and Cournot competition, we next compare the aggregate output
(and hence consumers’ surplus) under mixed oligopoly and the first best.
We find that the result depends on the whether the marginal cost function
is convex, or concave.
Lemma 2 The aggregate output (and consequently consumers’ surplus) un-
der mixed oligopoly is greater (respectively lower) than the first best level if
the marginal cost, c′(q), is concave (respectively convex). The two are equal
if the marginal cost function is linear.
Proof. Multiplying equation (5) by n, and adding (6) we have that
(n+ 1)f(Q′)− nc′(q′)− c′(q′0) = 0. (9)
If c′(q) is convex, then nc′(q′) + c′(q′0) > (n+ 1)c′(
Q′
n+1). Hence, from (9),
(n+ 1)f(Q′)− (n+ 1)c′( Q
′
n+ 1
) > 0. (10)
Next recall that the first best solves
f(Q∗)− c′( Q
∗
n+ 1
) = 0. (11)
Given that f(Q)− c′( Qn+1) is decreasing in Q, from (10) and (11), Q′ < Q∗.
Analogous arguments go through if c′(q) is concave, or linear.
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Suppose the marginal cost function is either convex, or linear. Then,
from Lemma 1 and 2, Qc < Q′ ≤ Q∗. Given that the first best must be
symmetric, the welfare under symmetry can be written as
∫ Q
0 f(z)dz− (n+
1)c( Qn+1), which is concave in Q. Hence welfare is increasing in Q till Q
∗.
Since Qc < Q′ ≤ Q∗, this implies that the welfare level is higher under a
mixed oligopoly compared to Cournot competition.
Proposition 2 If the marginal cost function is either convex or linear, then
privatization reduces welfare, i.e. welfare under mixed oligopoly exceeds that
under Cournot competition.
Note that Proposition 2 assumes that the cost function should not be
“too concave.” The intuition behind this restriction is as follows. Under a
mixed oligopoly the public firm over-produces compared to Cournot com-
petition with private firms. If, to the contrary, the cost function is “too
concave”, then there is an incentive to produce too much, even compared
to the first best, leading to welfare loss. Observe that Proposition 2 allows
for linear marginal cost, i.e. quadratic cost functions. As discussed in the
introduction, this result is in contrast to De Fraja and Delbono (1989).
3 Implementing the First Best
We then examine if the first best outcome can be implemented using some
optimal subsidy or tax policy.
We call a tax/subsidy schedule to be non-discriminating if the same
policy is applied to all firms. We first argue that the first best cannot be
implemented using such a non-discriminating tax/subsidy schedule.
Proposition 3 There exists no non-discriminating tax/subsidy policy that
can implement the first best.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary there exists some tax/subsidy policy
s(q), such that all firms produce at q∗. Then the FOC of the private firms
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involve f(Q∗)+ q∗f ′(Q∗)− c′(q∗)+ s(q∗) = 0. Hence, the FOC of the public
firm is −Q∗f ′(Q∗) = 0, which is a contradiction (since 0 < Q∗ < Qˆ).
Given Proposition 3, it is natural to ask if there is any tax/subsidy policy
that can implement the first best. Interestingly, we find that the first best
can be implemented through a constant tax on the public firm, coupled
with a subsidy on the private firms. Further, the optimal policy is budget
balancing.
Proposition 4 A constant per unit tax t = −(n+1)q∗f ′(Q∗) on the public
firm, coupled with a constant per unit subsidy of s = −q∗f ′(Q∗) on the
private firms, implements the first best and is budget-balancing.
Proof. We can mimic the argument in Proposition 1 to show that a
unique equilibrium exists. It then remains to show that given that all other
firms are producing q∗, it is optimal for every firm to do so. The FOC of
the i-th private firm involves
f(qi + nq∗) + qif ′(qi + nq∗)− c′(qi) + s = 0. (12)
Clearly, given that s = −q∗f ′(Q∗) and (3), qi = q∗ solves the above equation.
Next consider the public firm. The first order condition involves
c′(q0) + t− c′(q∗) + (n+ 1)q∗f ′(q0 + nq∗) = 0. (13)
Clearly, q0 = q∗ satisfies the above equation.
Finally, this policy is budget balancing since t = (n+ 1)s.
It is well known that under privatization (i.e. Cournot competition) a
non-discriminating subsidy can implement the first best (see, among others,
Kato and Tomaru (2007)). Thus Propositions 3 and 4, in conjunction with
this fact, demonstrate that the nature of the optimal tax/subsidy policy
is critically dependent on whether there is privatization or not, i.e. the
irrelevance principle does not hold.
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4 Conclusion
We consider a mixed oligopoly where the public firm maximizes the sum
of its own profits and consumers’ surplus. Apart from purely theoretical
interest,9 this is of relevance to many transitional economies. We character-
ize the unique equilibrium, and derive some interesting welfare properties.
As long as the cost function is not ‘too concave’, we find that privatization
reduces welfare. Further, we solve for the optimal tax/subsidy policy. Our
results suggest that the optimal tax/subsidy policy is critically dependent
on whether there is privatization or not.
Thus, in general, many of the results in the mixed oligopoly literature,
e.g. the irrelevance principle, seem to depend on how the public firm is
modeled, i.e. whether it is welfare maximizing, or consumer-friendly. From
a policy perspective, this suggests that one needs to be careful while applying
policy prescriptions drawn from the mixed oligopoly literature with welfare-
maximizing firms to transitional economies.
9De Fraja and Delbono (1989), for example, mention that they do not allow for any
agency problem. Our paper can be interpreted as a contribution in that direction, in the
sense that we allow public managers to have different objectives from public authority.
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